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A human influenza pandemic generally occurs every 
30-40 years, and many experts believe that the next 
pandemic is overdue. There are a number of require-
ments for a new pandemic to begin: i) emergence of a 
new viral strain to which general populations lack suf-
ficient immunity, ii) ability of this new strain to infect 
humans and to cause severe disease, and, iii) capabil-
ity  to  transmit  efficiently  among  humans,  i.e.,  be 
highly contagious. For a pandemic strain to establish 
at a global level it also requires a vehicle for world-
wide spread. 
 
Close  similarity  of  reconstructed  Spanish  influenza 
pandemic virus nucleotide sequence (Tumpey et al, 
2005) with that of the avian H1N1 virus (AH1N1), 
rather than any other mammalian HIN1 strains, and 
the  lethality  of  the  reconstructed  virus  for  fertile 
chicken  eggs,  indicates  that  the  Spanish  influenza 
pandemic of 1917-1918 might have been started by 
an avian virus. This influenza pandemic killed around 
50 million people globally. The large-scale spread of 
this influenza virus was fuelled by travelling armies 
of the World War 1 – the time that saw the movement 
of  around  10  million  soldiers  (who  also  frequently 
carried with them live poultry as food source!). 
 
Although no one knows which virus will be the cause 
of  the  next  human  influenza  pandemic,  one  strong 
candidate  with  the  capacity  to  set  off  such  a  pan-
demic is an avian influenza (bird flu) virus, AH5N1 – 
providing one of the basic elements of an influenza 
pandemic. This strain belongs to the family of avian 
influenza retroviruses, members of which cause vary-
ing  degree  of  respiratory  disease  in  poultry.  The 
strain of AH5N1 currently established in poultry is 
one of the most lethal known strain of this family; 
this strain is highly-contagious among poultry, has a 
relatively short incubation period (only a few hours), 
leading  to  certain  death  of  the  infected  birds.  The 
AH5N1 virus not only causes severe respiratory fail-
ure in birds, but also it causes extensive haemorrhage 
of internal organs – something similar to what Ebola 
virus does in humans. 
 
The  current  outbreak  of  the  lethal  avian  influenza 
was  first  detected  in  1997  in  Hong  Kong  where  a 
large  number  of  chickens  suddenly  died  of  severe 
respiratory failure and extensive haemorrhage. This 
region has been the source of at least one other flu 
pandemics in the late 1960s’. In this densely popu-
lated  region  general  population  routinely  trades  in 
live birds and animals, presenting a perfect scenario 
for the transmission of animal-to-human infections. 
Avian  influenza  viruses  very  rarely  infect  humans, 
yet the real concerns of the spread of AH5N1 to hu-
mans,  possibly  leading  to  a  pandemic,  cropped  up 
when at least eighteen human cases of AH5N1 infec-
tion  were  detected  in  Hong  Kong  leading  to  six 
deaths. Through drastic measures, involving culling 
of large poultry flocks (~1.5 million birds) and spray-
ing  of  large  areas  with  disinfectants,  this  outbreak 
was  quickly  suppressed.  Any  further  AH5N1  epi-
demics were unseen until its re-emergence in 2003 in 
poultry  flocks  in  South  Korea,  Thailand  and  Viet-
nam. On this occasion this virus infected nearly 120 
humans; almost half of those infected died of severe 
viral pneumonia and multi-organ failure. In the ear-
lier outbreak of 1997 this virus largely infected eld-
erly  human  populations;  however,  since  the  2003 
outbreak, it has infected largely younger individuals, 
including  children.  So  it  appears  that,  while  it  re-
mained in dormancy for a number of years, the virus 
has been evolving to acquire new genetic traits. The 
virus also seems to be expanding its host range and 
has  infected  other  animals  such  as,  mouse  model, 
cats and  tigers  (though further  transmission  of  this 
virus from these animals to humans has not been re-
ported). Worryingly, year 2005 also saw the spread 
of this virus through migratory birds to Russia, Tur-
key and Eastern Europe, and the isolation of AH5N1 
from a young patient that was resistant to the com-
mon  neuraminidase  inhibitory  anti-viral  drug,  osel- 
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tamivir  (Tamiflu)  (Le  et  al,  2005).  These  events, 
combined  with  the  continued  common  practice 
among  general  population  of  live  bird  and  animal 
trade in Asian countries, has again fuelled the fears 
of the AH5N1 strain might become the cause of a 
human influenza pandemic. 
 
Can AH5N1 be a cause of a flu pandemic, particu-
larly in its current form? This virus already has the 
ability to cross species barrier, and it can infect and 
cause severe disease in humans. What it lacks is the 
efficient  human-to-human  transmissibility.  Fortu-
nately, so far this has been rare. To-date there have 
been only two such reported cases in Vietnam where 
individuals  became  infected  with  this  virus,  appar-
ently without direct contact with live infected birds, 
leading to one death. While on one hand this shows 
that the general flora of this virus has limited genetic 
information  for  human-to-human  transmission  to 
cause a pandemic, on the other it is making progress 
in this direction. 
 
By  virtue  of  having  an  RNA  genome,  retroviruses 
have the capacity to mutate at a rapid pace, giving 
rise to variants with new antigenic properties. Since 
avian viruses are not normal human flora, the general 
human  populations  lack  immunity  against  them. 
Thus for this reason, if this virus somehow acquires 
the capability of efficient human-to-human transmis-
sion, it already has the necessary genetic footprint to 
causes widespread human disease, without the need 
for a major antigenic shift. However, for this virus to 
cause a major human pandemic it needs to be highly-
contagious, and ideally transmissible via droplet nu-
clei.  The  possibility  is  that  AH5N1  can  become 
highly-contagious  among  human  populations  either 
by  mutating  or  via  a  genetic  recombination  event 
(similar to human-swine recombinants (e.g., Ghedin 
et al, 2005)) with a normal human influenza virus. 
However,  all  indications  from  the  nucleotide  se-
quence  analysis  of  reconstructed  Spanish  influenza 
pandemic virus are that the avian influenza virus that 
might have caused the 1918 pandemic became con-
tagious in humans without a genetic recombination 
event. This suggests that, in theory, it is possible for 
AH5N1  to  become  an  efficient  human  pathogen 
through genetic mutations, with continuous exposure 
to humans. 
 
Furthermore, by virtue of the avian virus having dis-
tinct antigenic properties not known to human hosts, 
it has the capacity to cause an influenza pandemic, 
running in parallel with another influenza pandemic 
caused by a different virus. 
 
While air travel is likely to be a major fuel for the 
global spread of an influenza virus strain, the emer-
gence of viral strains that have the ability to infect 
both humans and migratory birds can be even more 
alarming.  However,  generally  as  bacterial  or  viral 
strains  evolve  to  become  more  infectious  to  get  a 
strong foothold in host populations, they also tend to 
become less virulent. Thus, we can hope that by the 
time the avian virus has learned high-infectivity and 
contagiousness in humans, it also becomes less viru-
lent, and that the world’s health services are better 
equipped to handle a pandemic. 
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